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It has been said that Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala is the Brown v.
Board of Education2 of human rights litigation.3  Like Brown,
Fildrtiga presents one of those rare "breakthrough moments" in law.
4
In Fildrtiga, the Second Circuit confirmed that victims of human
rights abuses abroad could seek legal redress in United States courts
under the then-obscure Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).5 Fildrtiga thus
inaugurated a steady line of cases in U.S. courts invoking the ATCA
. Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. The author has worked
on a number of human rights suits in United States courts and is a legal advisor to The Center
for Justice & Accountability, a nonprofit human rights law firm in San Francisco, CA. The
author is grateful for the support of the School of Law Faculty Scholarship Support Fund and for
the comments and insights of Carolyn Patty Blum, Sandra Coliver, Terry Collingsworth, Matt
Eisenbrandt, Deena Hurwitz, Ralph Steinhardt, Beth Stephens, and Stephanie Wildman on this
project. The author is also indebted to Roy Rosenthal and Kimberly Pederson for research
assistance.
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. H. H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1990-91).
4. Nan D. Hunter, Lawyering for Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1997).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) (granting the federal courts original jurisdiction over "any civil




and related statutes6 to adjudicate international human rights claims.
For a variety of reasons, including the very existence of these statutes,
civil litigation has emerged as a prominent means for the promotion of
international human rights norms in the United States. 7
Beyond the shared status of the two cases as legal watersheds,
the analogy between these cases-and indeed the premise of this
Symposium Panel-merits greater scrutiny. Accordingly, this essay
meditates on the way in which Fildrtiga and its progeny
simultaneously fit within, and diverge from, the model of public
impact litigation inaugurated-or at least exemplified-by Brown. A
brief summary of these cases reveals that in some respects, ATCA-
style litigation is a more modest enterprise, akin to personal injury or
mass tort suits involving individual victims seeking redress for
violations of international norms. That said, human rights advocates
share the ambitions of practitioners of "public impact" litigation in
using judicial processes to transcend the dispute between individual
litigants, advance a particular political cause or agenda, and produce
lasting and systemic changes in countries where human rights
violations occur.8  At the same time, these cases are no longer
exclusively a tactic of human rights lawyers. Members of the
plaintiffs' bar, who are perhaps motivated more by the potential high
stakes promised by these cases than by ideological or reform goals, are
increasingly initiating such suits. Thus the diversification of human
rights litigation in terms of actors, desired outcomes, and motivations
resists classification as any one litigation model.
This Essay then discusses the various "impacts" ATCA-style
litigation in United States can have on plaintiffs, their communities,
defendants, potential defendants, the human rights movement, and
other processes of social change in target countries. A necessarily
impressionistic survey of the results of ATCA-style cases filed to date
reveals that these impacts are most salient on the parties involved
and their immediate communities. The broader impact of human
6. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) (providing cause of action
for torture and summary execution); Anti-Terrorism Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2333 (2004) (allowing triple
damages recovery for victims of terrorist acts); Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1330, 1604-07 (2004) (providing exceptions to the general rule of foreign state immunity).
7. See Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
2 (2002) (discussing reasons for prominence of human rights civil litigation in the U.S.).
8. Paul B. Stephan, Export/Import: American Civil Justice in a Global Context: A
Becoming Modesty - U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627,
653-54 (2002). See generally Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
589 (1996) (positing an evolutionary link between civil rights litigation and domestic human
rights litigation).
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rights litigation is more speculative, as it remains difficult to measure
to what degree ATCA-style litigation has contributed to the deterrence
of perpetrators and ultimately the reform of states' treatment of their
citizens and others within their jurisdiction and control.
However, because confirmed first order effects remain worthy
of praise and replication, this lack of empirical "proof' of broader
second order effects does not undermine this effort. Indeed,
practitioners of ATCA-style litigation should be wary of espousing an
overabundance of objectives for this litigation, because doing so may
undermine or overshadow what these cases do accomplish for
individual victims of human rights abuses. Likewise, human rights
advocates should not pin their hopes on achieving these broader
impacts at the expense of their clients and their clients' experience
with the litigation process. In any case, notwithstanding the first and
second order effects that have been achieved, this Essay cautions that
such litigation should not replace other forms of human rights
advocacy. An overreliance on adversarial litigation, as opposed to
other processes of social change, raises some of the same concerns that
surface in the civil rights context about the efficacy of resorting to law
and the judicial process to promote durable social change and the
ability of the judicial process to address major social and economic
problems. 9
Putting these cautions to the side, several key cases are poised
to offer real opportunities for victims of rights violations to obtain
monetary compensation for the first time. The Supreme Court
recently confirmed the jurisprudential validity of these suits,
affirming the conclusions of the majority of courts to consider the
issue. 10 This Essay is thus concerned with the more strategic and
normative questions that remain: how do these cases advance the
human rights movement's norms and ideals?11 Should human rights
9. See generally, JACK M. BALKIN ET AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID 3-74 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (discussing Brown's legacy); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004) (discussing the struggles of racial equality from the Plessy era through school
desegregation); ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE
(1982) (discussing efficacy of using of litigation to promote social change in a number of
substantive areas); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001) (exploring Brown and its aftermath); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)
(questioning impact of Brown, Roe v. Wade, and other Supreme Court cases on social change).
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2761-62 (2004) (allowing suits involving
violations of norms "of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with ... specificity").
11. This Essay assumes the existence of a "human rights movement" with shared and
identifiable goals and strategies. To be sure, the movement is not monolithic. However, a core of
2004] 2307
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advocates promote an increase in ATCA-style litigation in the United
States? Should advocates encourage the adoption of similar statutes
abroad? How can ATCA practitioners ensure that these cases exert
the maximum impact-on parties and beyond? As the potential for
human rights enforcement in the classical sense becomes real, civil
cases in U.S. courts will increasingly join other domestic and
international institutions in their efforts to ensure comprehensive
accountability for human rights abuses, develop enforceable human
rights norms, provide redress for victims, and ultimately reform
human rights conditions around the world.
I. ATCA-STYLE LITIGATION AS PUBLIC IMPACT LITIGATION
"Public interest" litigation typically displays two paradigmatic
forms, each with its own objectives and strategies: direct client
advocacy and public impact litigation. 12  Direct client advocacy
prioritizes the needs of a given client as the primary focus of the
provision of legal services. In contrast, Brown and its progeny
exemplify the public impact model, which seeks to use legal tools and
the legal process to achieve more systemic change and advance
broader goals than the resolution of a discrete dispute between two
parties. 13 Many ATCA-style cases can be situated along a continuum
linking these two approaches, with different cases exemplifying
characteristics of the two models. Additionally, some of the most
recent ATCA-style cases cannot realistically be characterized as either
form, instead adhering to a private law model of mass tort litigation.14
human rights NGOs and activists/lawyers have committed themselves to ensuring the
fulfillment and enforcement of the corpus of human rights norms set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent multilateral instruments and conventions. Anti-
impunity has become an increasingly important component of this movement.
12. Karen L. Loewy, Note, Lawyering For Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1869,
1869-70 (2000) (citing Preface to Symposium, Political Lawyering Conversations on Progressive
Social Change, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (1996)); Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei,
Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Public Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to
Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 293, 294-95 (1993-94). Activists have identified a third
strategy of "rebellious lawyerine' focusing on community organizing and empowerment. See
William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 455, 465 (1994) (distinguishing empowerment
lawyering from other forms of public interest lawyering).
13. See Abram Chayes, The Role of The Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1291-95 (1976) (calling attention to this new species of litigation).
14. See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 422 (1999) (noting that mass tort litigation
is not typically brought to seek the reform of public, or even quasipublic institutions, but involves
private parties alleging private harms and invoking state, rather than federal or constitutional,
law).
2308 [Vol. 57:6:2305
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While Fildrtiga itself was a test of the modern applicability of
the ATCA, the path of ATCA litigation has not exhibited the same
level of coordination that marked the desegregation litigation leading
up to and later heralded by Brown.15 Indeed, rather than proceeding
through a series of strategic test cases, ATCA litigation has evolved
more organically and opportunistically. This is due in part to the
cases' tort character; although potential plaintiffs abound,
16
constitutionally grounded principles of personal jurisdiction require at
least the transient presence of a defendant. In addition, litigation is
party-driven, without national or international oversight, 17 so the
direction this line of precedent has taken is not readily subject to
control. Although several key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and affinity groups routinely engage in ATCA-style litigation,18 and
15. See Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interest in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 473 (1975) (discussing the NAACP's strategy of using
exemplary case litigation to combat racial segregation); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments
and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (2003) (discussing NAACP's litigation
test case strategy); see also Loewy, supra note 12, at 1881 (2000) (describing ACLU's test case
strategy).
16. It has been estimated that there are thousands of survivors of torture and other human
rights abuses in the United States. Mary Fabri, Torture and Impunity: Legal Recourse May Lead
to Healing, 16 TRAUMATIC STRESS POINTS 2 (2002), at http://www.istss.org/publications/TS/
SpringO2/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). Nonetheless, many potential plaintiffs will
decline to participate in litigation because they fear retaliation against themselves or family
members who remain in their home country, or because they are concerned that litigation will be
too emotionally draining or outcomes too uncertain.
• 17. Harvey Rishikoff, Framing International Rights with a Janusism Edge - Foreign
Policy and Class Actions - Legal Institutions as Soft Power, 2003 U. CHIC. LEGAL F. 247, 273-74
(2003).
18. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) inaugurated this field with the Fildrtiga
case. According to its mission statement:
CCR uses litigation proactively to advance the law in a positive direction, to empower
poor communities and communities of color, to guarantee the rights of those with the
fewest protections and least access to legal resources, to train the next generation of
constitutional and human rights attorneys, and to strengthen the broader movement
for constitutional and human rights.
Center for Constitutional Rights, About, Our Mission, at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/about/mission-
vision.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). Similarly, the Center for Justice and Accountability is
devoted to bringing ATCA-style cases in order to "deter torture and other severe human rights
abuses around the world by helping survivors hold their perpetrators accountable." Center for
Justice and Accountability, About CJA, Mission, at http://www.cja.org/aboutCJA/
aboutCJA.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). In addition, certain "cause" NGOs have begun to
incorporate ATCA-style litigation into their issue-specific strategies. Examples include the
International Labor Rights Fund, whose mission statement explains that the organization
promotes the "enforcement of labor rights internationally through public education and
mobilization, research, litigation, legislation, and collaboration with labor, government and
business groups." International Labor Rights Fund, About ILRF, at http://www.laborrights.org
(last visited Feb. 6, 2004). Likewise, EarthRights International seeks to combine "the power of
law and the power of people in defense of human rights and the environment, our earth rights."
EarthRights International, About ERI, Mission, at http://www.earthrights.org/about/
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seasoned ATCA lawyers regularly collaborate on cases, no one NGO
has coordinated this litigation in the centralized way that the
NAACP's Legal Defense Fund (LDF) was able to direct the
desegregation litigation.19
ATCA-style litigation comes in three primary forms: actions
against individual perpetrators, actions against corporations doing
business in countries where human rights abuses are occurring, and
actions against U.S. government officials or employees involving
alleged abuses in or attributable to the United States. Although an
important goal of civil human rights litigation is the reform of abusive
government practices, principles of foreign sovereign immunity have
prevented most suits against repressive governments from proceeding
in a direct manner (unless one of the narrow exceptions to immunity
mission.shtml (last updated Feb. 6, 2005). The following NGOs have also engaged in ATCA-style
litigation: Global Exchange (http://www.globalexchange.org), the Asian Law Caucus
(http://www.altrue.net/site/alc/section.php?id=3007), Judicial Watch (http://www.judicialwatch.
org/cases.shtml), and Sweatshop Watch (http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/
lawsuit.html). Other human rights organizations have at times supported litigation here and
abroad, but generally do not bring cases. For example:
Human Rights Watch researchers conduct fact-finding investigations into human
rights abuses by governments and non-state actors in all regions of the world .... By
exposing human rights violations, this publicity shames abusers and helps to put
pressure on them to reform their conduct. Human Rights Watch seeks dialog with
offending governments to encourage them to change abusive laws and policies.
Human Rights Watch, About HRW, Some Frequently Asked Questions About Human Rights
Watch: How Do You Do Your Work, at http://www.hrw.org/about/faq (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
Likewise, Amnesty International "seeks to disclose human rights abuses accurately, quickly and
persistently. It systematically and impartially researches the facts of individual cases and
patterns of human rights abuses. These findings are publicized, and members, supporters and
staff mobilize public pressure on governments and others to stop the abuses." Amnesty
International, About Al, Statute of Amnesty International, 3. Methods, at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-statute-eng (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). And, the mission of
Human Rights First, formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, is to "support human
rights activists who fight for basic freedoms and peaceful change at the local level; protect
refugees in flight from persecution and repression; help build a strong international system of
justice and accountability; and make sure human rights laws and principles are enforced in the
United States and abroad." http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about-us/aboutus.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004). Many of these latter organizations fear that becoming involved in litigation will
jeopardize their ability to conduct fact-finding missions overseas or refrain from litigation on the
grounds that it is being pursued by other groups. Law school human rights clinics may also
initiate suits or work with NGOs on cases. See generally Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for
Justice and the Inevitability of Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505 (2003) (cataloging
work of law school human rights clinics).
19. The bringing of strategic criminal cases in Europe through the partie civile process
(which allows victims of crime to initiate criminal proceedings) and pursuant to the principle of
universal jurisdiction may manifest a greater degree of coordination than civil litigation in the
United States. See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and
Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2001)
(describing advocacy network developed in Europe to pursue universal jurisdiction cases).
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applies). 20 Thus, ATCA-style litigation must proceed more indirectly
against individual defendants who do not benefit from other forms of
immunity, such as head of state or diplomatic immunity, or who as
private actors are amenable to suit.21 The first ATCA cases generally
proceeded against individual defendants hailing from defunct, pariah
or politically unimportant regimes. 22 Recently, however, plaintiffs'
lawyers have become more ambitious in their targets, pursuing sitting
heads of state2 and other high government officials hailing from U.S.-
allied nations or strategically important regimes.
24
In the second class of cases, plaintiffs have filed a number of
cases against multinational corporate entities (MNCs) typically
engaged in resource extraction or offshore production (either directly
or through wholly-owned subsidiaries) in states where human rights
abuses are prevalent. The apparent viability of the corporate cases
provoked a number of NGOs concerned with environmental and labor
rights to add ATCA litigation to their advocacy tactics. 25 Some such
cases involve allegations that the corporations engaged, or continue to
engage, in rights abuses directly. 26 Others attempt to hold corporate
20. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA
withholds immunity to certain designated states for suits involving claims of money damages for
acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, or terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2004).
21. The case against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed leader of a rogue Serbian state,
paved the way for ATCA cases against corporate defendants. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second
Circuit confirmed that private actors could be held liable for certain international law violations.
70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We hold that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, that Karadzic
may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private
capacity and for other violations in his capacity as a state actor.").
22. Cases have been brought against several individuals hailing from former dictatorships.
See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (case involving former prisoners in
Ethiopia against official of former Ethiopian government); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (case against
the self-proclaimed leader of "Republika Srpska," the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (action against a former general by
Argentine citizens currently living in the U.S. for injuries committed by subordinates under the
general's authority and control); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(case against Ghanaian officer).
23. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing
suit against President of Zimbabwe and other sitting officials on immunity grounds, but granting
default judgment against the President's political party), rev'd 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding that individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity were not proper agents for service of
process for political party).
24. See, e.g., Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000) (case against Chinese
Politburo members and others).
25. See supra note 18.
26. See, e.g., Arias v. DynCorp, No. 01-01908 (D.D.C. 2001) (alleging that the company
unlawfully sprayed poisons on farmers in Colombia and Ecuador).
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actors liable for the abuses of foreign governments through theories of
complicity, joint action, and agency.
27
With respect to the third class of case against U.S. agents or
officials, ATCA-style litigation has rarely provided the opportunity to
"engineer"28 the kind of domestic institutional reform agenda pursued
by other public impact litigation,29 such as Brown and its progeny.
30
In a virtually extinct line of cases targeting past and present U.S.
government officials in an effort to influence U.S. foreign policy, courts
have been close to unanimous in ruling that such suits are barred by
sovereign immunity doctrines or raise nonjusticiable political
27. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging
company in joint venture with Burmese autocracy was jointly liable for governmental abuses
committed in connection with pipeline project).
28. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 6 (1994) (noting civil rights pioneer Charles
Hamilton Houston's description of civil rights litigation as "social engineering").
29. Thus, these cases may never entirely achieve Professor Chayes's vision of "public law"
litigation with its attendant dialogues between the courts and state bureaucracies to effectuate
constitutional values. Chayes, supra note 13, at 1282-83; Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
30. Suits involving abuses by United States government officials or employees can proceed
under other statutory schemes designed specifically for this purpose. For example, suits alleging
the perpetration of international torts by U.S. government employees or officials generally
proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), 2671-2680 (2004). The
FTCA provides an exclusive remedy for tort claims for personal injury or death against a
government employee acting within the scope of his office or employment (except for intentional
torts committed by agents other than law enforcement agents), with the government substituted
as defendant. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2003). In
Alvarez, for example, the plaintiffs ATCA claims against U.S. agents for arbitrary detention
were converted to FTCA claims. Id. However, the plaintiffs claims under the ATCA against a
Mexican national involved in the incident at the U.S. Government's behest, but deemed not to be
a government employee, proceeded to a bench trial and resulted in a $25,000 judgment for the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court recently reversed on other grounds. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124
S.Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004). Cases against U.S. officials involving constitutional violations proceed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as Bivens actions. Likewise, the Supreme Court suggested that the
ATCA would provide a remedy for individuals detained and mistreated in U.S. detention centers
in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2693-94 (2004).
2312
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questions.31 However, suits may proceed to the extent that private
actors are working in conjunction with U.S. government agencies.
32
The first generation of individual ATCA-style actions was
initiated by lawyers affiliated with nonprofit human rights
organizations, or lawyers working pro bono, who were inspired by the
tradition of using legal tools to advance morality-driven goals.3 3 At the
outset, these legal pioneers sought to establish the ATCA as a tool for
the enforcement of human rights norms and to gain judicial
elaboration of the scope of those norms. Although ostensibly tort
disputes seeking retrospective relief,34  obtaining an executable
judgment was often a secondary goal of this litigation. Indeed, most of
the cases' damage awards were issued by default and/or are
unenforceable-"a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will."35  Nonetheless, the cases exposed the presence of
alleged abusers within the United States,3 6 created an opportunity for
norm enunciation, and achieved, at a minimum, a symbolic
denunciation of abuses. Many ATCA-style cases involving individual
victims exemplify the client advocacy approach to litigation, with
practitioners intent on providing their clients with a meaningful
experience through civil litigation as a form of psychosocial
rehabilitation. Other cases, by contrast, are more defendant-oriented
and are thus geared toward exposing both the abuses and the
31. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (claims by
Nicaraguans, members of Congress, and two American citizens challenging United States policy
in Nicaragua dismissed on political question grounds, sovereign immunity grounds, and for lack
of pendant jurisdiction); De Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suit to
enjoin operation of regional military training center for Salvadoran soldiers on Honduran ranch
dismissed by the district court on political question grounds and affirmed for failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 321 (D.D.C. 1988),
affd 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (suit dismissed on immunity grounds for U.S. bombing
damage in Libya); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332,
1338-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 755 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissing case seeking to enjoin
movement of U.S. cruise missiles in Great Britain on political question grounds).
32. For example, suit was recently filed against two private contractors regarding alleged
abuses in detention centers in Iraq. Complaint, Al Rawi v. Titan Corp., (S.D. Cal. Filed June 4,
2004) available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september-1 lth/docs/AlRawi_vTitan_
Complaint.pdf.
33. Loewy, supra note 12, at 1876:
34. Chayes, supra note 13, at 1282-83 (cataloging characteristics of traditional private law
litigation).
35. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Amnesty International and others have estimated that there may be upwards of one
thousand human rights abusers in the United States. Sandra Coliver, Human Rights
Accountability: Impact of Tort Cases Against Individual Perpetrators, ALTERNET (Nov. 10, 2003),
at http://www.alternet.org/story/17151/.
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perpetrators to public scrutiny and opprobrium. 37 Human rights
advocates have generally cheered these strategies and results,
although a few detractors have denounced this endeavor as nothing
more than ideological theatre.
38
As ATCA jurisprudence became more established and courts
confirmed that corporations could be sued for human rights abuses,
the statute was "discovered" by plaintiff-side lawyers more
accustomed to bringing shareholder derivative actions and mass tort
litigation through the class action mechanism. 39 These practitioners
have filed a number of cases against corporate entities amenable to
suit in the United States, some on the heels of individual actions
involving similar claims and with the benefit of their predecessor's
factual investigations and legal briefing. 40 The arrival of these legal
37. For example, Toto Constant, the head of the Haitian paramilitary organization FRAPH,
was recently sued in the Southern District of New York after a long campaign to secure his
deportation. See http://www.cja.org/cases/Constant.shtml.
38. See wa Mutua, supra note 8; Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 7 (arguing that human
rights cases brought in U.S. have had little impact in countries where abuses occurred and
provide little more than "symbolic benefits" for plaintiffs).
39. A number of class action and plaintiff-side firms have recently engaged in litigation
alleging international human rights violations under the ATCA. These include, for example,
Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP Practices, Human Rights, Overview (representing
victims in Holocaust litigation and the parents of Nigerian children allegedly administered
experimental drugs without consent, Abdullahi v. Pfizer Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002), vac'd and remanded, 77 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003)), at
http://www.milbergweiss.com/practice/practicedetail.aspx?pgid=808 (last visited Feb. 6, 2005);
Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Our Practice Areas, International Human Rights (representing
class of former comfort women suing Japan, Indonesian villagers abused by security forces
employed by Exxon Mobil, and South African NGOs seeking compensation from U.S. companies
who did business with the apartheid regime), at http://www.cmht.comlhumanrights.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2004); McCallion & Associates, LLP, Practice Areas: International Human Rights
(representing victims suing Union Carbide for Bhopal incident (In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)), at http://www.mccallionlaw.com/
litigationpgs/practice.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004); Berger and Montague, PC, Practice Areas,
Civil/Human Rights Litigation (representing WWII victims in cases against Swiss and other
banks (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 225
F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000)); a class of Sudanese citizens suing a Canadian oil company accused of
acting in complicity with the repressive Sudanese government (Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); a class of victims from Nigeria
suing Royal Dutch Shell), at http://www.bergermontague.com/civil-human-rights-litigation.cfm
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005); Fagan & Associates (representing class of apartheid victims against
corporations doing business in South Africa); Hagens Berman LLP, Current Cases, Rio Tinto
Litigation (representing class in suit against a mining company active in Papua New Guinea
(Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)), at http://www.hagens-
berman.comlriotinto lawsuit (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
40. For example, individual plaintiffs brought suit against Royal Dutch Shell and others in
connection with the company's oil extraction operations in Nigeria. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23064, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). After plaintiffs had successfully defended against
several motions to dismiss on personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and other grounds, a
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entrepreneurs marks the departure of ATCA-style litigation from the
exclusive domain of pro bono and NGO litigators.
Human rights lawyers have greeted these new entrants with
ambivalence. On the one hand, activists are encouraged that the
jurisprudence is robust enough to attract attorneys with pecuniary
motivations and welcome the increased pressure on MNCs to reform
their overseas practices in keeping with human rights standards. On
the other hand, they recognize the potential for ill-founded cases to
create "bad law" and for other goals of the movement to be
undermined where counsels' objectives, priorities, and tactics may
diverge dramatically from those of human rights lawyers. 41  A
promising response to this tension can be found in attempts by career
human rights lawyers and NGOs to partner with members of the
plaintiffs' bar. Under this division of labor, the activists provide the
expertise in client relations, knowledge of the relevant norms, contacts
on the ground, client relationships, and political pull. The firms
provide the familiarity with the class action device and the resources
to ensure some measure of equality of arms vis-A-vis corporate
adversaries.
42
class action was filed by class action attorneys Berger & Montague, P.C. against the company.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Case No. 02 Civ. 7618. For information on the case, see
MOSOP OGONI, Shell in Ogoni Class Action Lawsuit (March 2003), at
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/sarticles/shell-in-ogoni-class-action-laws.htm. Likewise, in
Jama v. United States I.N.S., a law school clinic with pro bono attorneys brought suit on behalf
of individual asylum seekers who alleged that they had been subject to abuse (including torture
and abject living conditions) in detention centers administered by private contractors hired by
the then INS. 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998). Several years later, a personal injury firm,
Ressler & Ressler, filed a class action, certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), on behalf of all
detainees in the same facility. DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 215 F.R.D. 477, 478-
81 (D.N.J. 2003) (recounting procedural history); Ressler & Ressler, Significant Practice Areas,
Class Actions and Mass Torts, (noting the certification), at http://www.resslerlaw.com/class-
actions.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
41. For example, in the cases involving the detention of asylum seekers, class and
defendants' counsel, without consulting counsel for the individual actions, agreed upon a notice
plan, whose design and implementation soon proved to be unrealistic and unworkable. See
DaSilva, 215 F.R.D. at 483 (rejecting postponement of an opt out election based on difficulty of
delivering notice to immigrants being held for deportation). When the individual plaintiffs
attempted to opt out of the class, class counsel and defendants' counsel resisted, demanding that
the individual plaintiffs litigate their claims within the context of the class action. Id. In
particular, defendant Esmor Correction Services argued that allowing the individual plaintiffs to
opt out would jeopardize any settlement of the class action. Id. Although the reported opinion
does not address the issue head on, the case contains whiffs of collusion between defendants' and
class counsel concerning the notice plan and any potential settlement of the action. Id. at 484.
The court allowed the individual actions to proceed, in part based upon the plaintiffs' extensive
investment in the case, but also, it appears, because the court recognized that counsel for the
individual actions were monitoring class counsel in the way that the ostensible class
representatives could not. Id. at 484-85.
42. For example, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) has partnered with asbestos
and tobacco litigators Provost & Umphrey Law Firm LLP to sue Coca-Cola over rights abuses by
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Nonetheless, the proliferation of lawyers involved in ATCA-
style litigation has given rise to concerns about coordination and
oversight. Given the indeterminacy of the ATCA's reach and the weak
constraints on initiating suit, activists and entrepreneurs of various
stripes have seized on the statute's potential to serve as the basis for
suit for any number of grievances that may be styled as "torts in
violation of international law."43  Thus, in certain instances, the
statute has become a vehicle for advocacy groups to advance their
more narrow political agendas through cause-based litigation 44 or for
plaintiffs' attorneys to pressure deep-pocketed defendants. 45 To date,
the courts have proved themselves capable of rigorously evaluating
the underlying claims 46 to ensure that they are grounded in
international law47 and are consistent with domestic and international
law immunity principles. Even where unmeritorious ATCA-style
cases are disposed of by the courts in the same way that they dispose
its bottlers in Colombia. International Labor Rights Fund, Colombian Plaintiffs File Amended
Complaint Against Coca-Cola (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.laborrights.org/press/
cokeamended_0404.htm.
43. See, e.g., http://www.fofg.org/ourworklourworkstory.php?doc-id=457 (noting suit for
genocide against President Jiang Zemin).
44. See Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical"
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
473, 481 (2002) (discussing use by Falun Gong practitioners of the ATCA to sue high ranking
Chinese officials whenever they travel to the United States).
45. For example, a controversial set of cases was filed recently against multiple corporate
defendants seeking to hold them liable for complicity in apartheid by virtue of their doing
business in South Africa during the apartheid era. See In re South Africa Apartheid Litigation,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 02 M.D.L. 1499, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23944 (S.D.N.Y.
November 29, 2004) (dismissing case on multiple grounds, including inadequate theory of
liability); see also Jonathan Birchall, The Limits of Human Rights Legislation, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES LTD., Jan. 20, 2005, at 13 (noting that the apartheid case did not have wide support of the
U.S. human rights community and was "widely expected to face rapid dismissal.").
46. See Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 485, 487-88 (2001) (noting that courts have weeded out cases alleging inappropriate
claims).
47. For example, courts have rejected claims for relief when the action giving rise to the suit
was related to commercial endeavors. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca Cola, 239 F.3d 440, 455 (2d Cir.
2000) (rejecting claims based on fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty); IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining jurisdiction over an action for fraud, conversion, and
corporate waste); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973) (rejecting
claims based on contractual rights); Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 259 F. Supp. 324, 327
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (finding that commercial torts, such as interference with contractual relations, do
not qualify for universal enforcement); De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp.
613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no subject-matter jurisdiction based on breach of contract and
corporate tort claims). See also Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (finding
free speech violations do not rise to the level of a law of nations violation); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of
Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that a foreign
sovereign's expropriation of property does not violate any universal norm under international
law).
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of other weak cases that come before them, the notoriety of several
high profile suits has nonetheless given rise to a perception that
ATCA-style litigation is proceeding without adequate limitations,
increasingly motivated by less than meritorious impulses, interfering
with U.S. foreign relations and trade opportunities, and, accordingly,
is less worthy of approbation. Further, cases advancing weak or
frivolous claims may threaten to trivialize more worthy cases. Pleas
for a cautionary approach have even begun to be heard from seasoned
ATCA lawyers who, as a result of this more decentralized development
of ATCA jurisprudence and the emerging diversity of lawyers engaged
in this work, have difficulty keeping track of all the cases that have
been filed to date48 and must consider whether and how to influence
shaky cases in order to protect case precedent and the integrity of the
enterprise. It remains to be seen to what extent the Supreme Court's
guidance in Sosa will curb some of the more controversial cases.
II. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS
As ATCA-style jurisprudence has matured and proliferated, it
is increasingly possible to gauge the impact of these cases, even if only
through individual case studies and anecdotal evidence. The
remainder of this Essay will begin to consider this impact along a
number of dimensions to reflect the multifaceted objectives of the
human rights movement. The most obvious objective of litigation is
the enforcement of human rights norms within the legalist paradigm
of the application of a rule of law backed by sanctions. While this level
of enforcement has remained elusive, litigation has achieved other
objectives of the human rights movement, including the rehabilitation
of victims and the empowerment of victimized communities, the
establishment of accountability for rights violations, the creation of
enforceable expectations of behavior, the clarification of applicable
norms, the denunciation of violations, and the fostering and
strengthening of a vigorous human rights movement worldwide.
48. Each year, the American Civil Liberties Union reports on ongoing ATCA-style cases, see
Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Litigation Update: A Summary of Recent Developments in U.S.
Cases Brought Under the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, at
http://sdshh.com/ICLR/ICLR-2003/5_Green.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2004); see also Terry
Collingsworth, Summary of Current ILRF Cases To Enforce Human Rights Under The ATCA, at




A. On Plaintiffs and Their Communities
From the perspective of individual plaintiffs, the human rights
edifice has as an express goal the rehabilitation of the victims of
human rights abuses. Where ATCA practitioners adopt a client
advocacy approach to litigation, human rights cases in U.S. courts can
have a profound impact on victims of human rights violations and
their communities. 49 Participating as a plaintiff in human rights
litigation can restore and promote a sense of agency-the impression
that we exercise some control over the processes and events that affect
us-especially when that sense was destroyed by the very conduct
that is the subject of the suit. Beyond physical harm, the human
rights abuses at issue typically involve protracted denials of dignity,
liberty, choice, personal integrity, and autonomy, and the mere act of
reconceptualizing oneself as a holder of rights can offer a sense of
empowerment. 50 Such litigation presents opportunities for corrective
justice and provides victims of human rights violations with "an
exercise in self-determination" 51 that inverts the status of victim and
perpetrator. By contrast, pervasive impunity can exacerbate the
dignitary harm caused by torture and other abuses by perpetuating
feelings of injustice, fear, and vulnerability, especially where abusers
live in the same communities as their victims. 52
In addition, litigation provides victims with access to a
narrative forum 53 that enables the victim to name her experience 54
49. For a fuller discussion of the impact of litigation on plaintiffs, see Brief of The Center
for Justice and Accountability et al. at 7-13, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No.
03-339) (compiling statements by plaintiffs in ATCA-style suits), available at
http://www.nosafehaven.org/_legal/atca-pro_cntrJustAccntNCTTP.pdf; Center for Justice &
Accountability, For Survivors (compiling statements by survivors/plaintiffs), at
http://www.cja.org/forSurvivors/forSurvivors.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). See also Joshua
Phillips, The Case Against the Generals, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at W6 (interviewing
plaintiff who states, "the whole process -- especially the trial - has been crucial to my healing
process").
50. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 661-62 (1987-88); see also Jan Gorecki,
Human Rights: Explaining the Power of a Moral and Legal Idea, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 153, 154-55
(1987) (conceptualizing the driving power of rights).
51. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL ED. 49, 50 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Fabri, supra note 16 ("The effects of torture are compounded by impunity.
Impunity for human rights atrocities contributes to the ongoing state of fear that survivors live
with day to day. The unpunished crimes of the perpetrators continue to violate survivors'
personal sense of integrity and freedom.").
53. Austin Serat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L.
REV. 353, 356 (1996). ("Narrative provides a link between the daily reality of violence in which
law traffics and the normative ideal - justice - to which law aspires.").
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and to situate it within a larger policy or practice of repression.55 Tort
rhetoric in particular invites the attribution of legal responsibility and
moral blameworthiness, thus contributing to the alleviation of feelings
of guilt that may arise from past participation in political activities,
"allowing" oneself to be captured, capitulating under interrogation,
and ultimately surviving. These discursive processes of "naming,
blaming, and claiming"56 are important features of civil litigation (as
compared with criminal prosecutions) 57 and are especially compelling
in ATCA-style litigation where the responsible government may have
denied an effective remedy, or even the very existence of violations,
and silenced the voices of victims through force or intimidation. In
addition, being accorded fair procedures before a neutral and
respectful decisionmaker may provide a surrogate for apology,
repentance, and contrition from responsible parties 58 and a "controlled
substitute for vigilantism" 59 or reprisals. The very process of a court
determining the validity of a claim will force an examination of the
historical record,60 even if the outcome is ultimately not successful.
61
54. Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in
Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 628 (1996) (discussing the creation of a
"self-authored" life story through litigation).
55. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152,
2152-62 (1989) (identifying local and political narratives and the "confluence" of the two in a
legal judgment).
56. William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 631 (1980-81).
57. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 18-21 (comparing criminal and civil procedures in human
rights litigation); Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 141, 156-59, 195 (2001) (noting different role of victims in civil and criminal processes).
58. Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for
Harm: Examining the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 381 (2003).
59. Developments in the Law, International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1967
(2001).
60. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 383 (1987). In the slavery reparations case, for example, plaintiffs
sought to compel the production of relevant documents in order to create an accurate historical
record of economic relationships underlying the institution of slavery. In re African-American
Slave Descendants' Litig., MDL No. 1491, Lead Case No. 02 C 7764, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 872,
at *30-31 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2004) (discussing accounting cause of action); In re African-American
Slave Descendants' Litig., MDL No. 1491, Lead Case No. 02 C 7764, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12016, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2003). In their complaint, plaintiffs argued that the production of
those records was essential to "heal the continuing psychic harm associated with slavery, trace
ancestral records, provide a public and historical record of the violent force necessary to maintain
a hierarchy to support slavery, provide evidence of past and subsequently established
discrimination, provide a historical record of the economic benefits that accrued to the defendant
private institutions as a result of slavery to more fully describe and document the connection
between the institution of slavery and racist discriminatory policies that still exist today, and
assist in stemming racial discrimination through the knowledge of the role slavery played in its
root causes." Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 221, Farmer-Paellmann v FleetBoston
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This judicial record can then enhance and further focus the fact
finding and reporting efforts of human rights documentation groups.62
Where it is successful, litigation also offers the promise of a re-
ordering of one's worldview of good and evil that ascribes new
meaning to the traumatic experience itself. Thus, litigation can
generate a form of collective memory, particularly in the face of
counternarratives that would deny the existence of violations or
portray victims as subversives, deserving of punishment.6 3 Litigation
also provides victims with an opportunity for "history making,"
although this aim of impact litigation generally must be balanced with
the trial's fundamental purpose of reaching a fair legal judgment. 64
While the cathartic power of litigation is often extolled, 65 it has
not been adequately tested empirically. 66 It is clear that litigation is
not therapy. Parties to a civil suit are constrained by procedural and
evidentiary rules and the imposed order of other judicial rituals, and
plaintiffs may find conforming their testimony to justiciable legal
claims and admissibility rules to be limiting, illegitimate and
alienating. In particular, plaintiffs may not be allowed to reenact
their whole story or to emphasize aspects that are the most important
to them but are "irrelevant" from the perspective of the legal process.
Thus other fora - the press, psychotherapy, reflective writing,
support groups, truth commissions, etc. - may be better suited for
Financial Corp. (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2004), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/slavery
/fpllmnflt032602cmp.pdf.
61. See generally JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE
LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003) (discussing the impact of failed cases on processes of
social change).
62. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HLUM. RTS. J. 183, 197 (2002) ("The often thorough and well-documented
human rights reporting that is occurring today will finally have a specific context for assisting in
the enforcement of human rights norms.").
63. Serat, supra note 53, at 366 ("[T]he litigated case can be used to create a record, and the
court can become the archive in which the record services as the materialization of memory.");
MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 209-39 (2001) (discussing role
of law (and particularly of trials involving state abuses) in forging collective memory).
64. See generally LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW &
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001) (arguing that human rights trials should offer
a forum for victim testimony and the creation of an "official" historical record). But see Stephen
Whinston, Can Lawyers and Judges Be Good Historians? A Critical Examination of the Siemens
Slave Labor Cases, 20 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 160, 167-69 (2002) (arguing that errors of history
underlie the dismissal of several World War II historical justices cases).
65. Fabri, supra note 16; JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 209-211 (1997).
66. Jamie O'Connell, Gambling the Psyche at 7-8 (noting lack of empirical studies on the
impact of litigation on victims) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
2320 [Vol. 57:6:2305
CIVIL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
victims to provide a full narrative account of their personal history
and to establish broader truths.
67
In addition, the potential for litigation to retraumatize is ever
present. Litigation is inherently adversarial, and defendants are
entitled to defend against the accusations leveled at them. In practice,
this may involve attempts to discount a plaintiffs account through
rigorous cross-examination and the presentation of contrary or
impeaching evidence. In particular, where victims do not relate the
memories of their experiences in a consistent sequential manner,
which is often the case with victims of extreme trauma, 68 a
defendant's aggressive cross-examination on credibility and accuracy
can do real damage.69 In addition, the plaintiff must be prepared to
lose his case, regardless of the truth of the harm suffered, which can
create deep anxiety over the course of the suit and upon the
announcement of a negative verdict.70  Finally, although some
measure of anonymity may be available, 71 civil litigation forces
plaintiffs into the public eye, which can render them and their loved
ones particularly vulnerable to negative social ramifications or even
retaliation, especially where abuses are ongoing. 72 Where plaintiffs
counsel adopts a client-centered approach and remains attuned to his
clients and their evolving perception of the legal process, negative
responses to litigation can be identified and addressed through
counseling and other interventions. The attorney can enable the
plaintiff to situate her lawsuit within a larger movement toward
accountability, so that "[h]er particular battle becomes part of a
larger, ongoing struggle to impose the rule of law on the arbitrary
67. Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 463, 524 (1995) (noting that "judges - when faithful to liberal law and professional
ethics - may make poor historians.").
68. See generally Jane Herlihy et al., Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories-
Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interviews Study, 324 BRIT. MED. J.
324, 324 (2002) (presenting research showing that discrepancies in accounts by victims of
extreme trauma is not necessarily indicative of a lack of credibility).
69. Osiel, supra note 67, at 540 (noting the potential in the human rights context for "the
experience of public testimony ... [to be] personally degrading rather than empowering.").
70. See, e.g., Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessful suit by the
relatives of the "four churchwomen" who were raped and killed in El Salvador).
71. See, e.g., Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3 (D. D.C. 1998) (suit on behalf of
eight anonymous Algerian women against a violent Algerian political group); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Mass. 1995) (recounting harm to nine year-old boy in a suit against the
former Guatemalan Minister of Defense); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (suit
by anonymous plaintiffs against Bosnian Serb military leader).
72. See, e.g., Falun Dafa Information Center, Judgment Against High Ranking Official
Handed Down By U.S. Court (Dec. 23, 2001) (recounting that Chinese plaintiff had been




tyranny of the strong."73 At all times, counsel must be sensitive to the
fact that litigation is painful and difficult, even where successful.7 4
In most personal injury suits, the enforcement of the applicable
legal right is achieved through the attainment and execution of a
money judgment quantifying the established harm. Thus, the
traditional relief requested in ATCA-style cases was retrospective,
although complaints and judgments often contained a tacit
acknowledgment of the incommensurability of the harm caused by the
alleged human rights violations. 75  A damage award-even where
unenforced-as a medium of social meaning marks a "spiritual
victory"76  over an oppressor, recognizes concrete damage to
individuals, and is symbolic of a plaintiffs loss. Where an award can
be enforced, money damages provide economic support to enable
rehabilitation and reintegration into society and confers a measure of
social standing on plaintiffs.
At the same time, the illusion of claim equivalence created by a
damage award may ultimately alienate rather than relieve victims of
rights abuses. Human rights violations involve not just wrongful
injury to material worth-harm that can be relatively easily
quantified and compensated for-but also moral injury deserving of
nonmonetary responses, such as acknowledgment, retribution and
apology. Indeed, the quest for moral accountability in the form of
apology or repentance may be more pressing for victims than economic
accountability.7 7 Plaintiffs may resent the "commodification" of their
experience when forced to quantify in financial terms the harm caused
73. HERMAN, supra note 65, at 211.
74. See The Center for Justice and Accountability, Statements by Plaintiff Juan Romagoza
on the Significance of Romagoza, Gonzalez, & Mauricio v. Garcia & Vides Casanova: A Case
Against Two High Ranking Salvadoran Generals for Torture Committed 1979-83, at 2
[hereinafter Statements by Juan Romagoza], at http://www.cja.org/forSurvivors/reflect.doc (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005):
Before the trial started, I couldn't sleep. I felt fear knowing that the generals would
confront me. I wasn't frightened of them so much as how my body might react. I was
afraid of how I would feel being face to face with them again, so close .... I had a lot
of problems with insomnia; I had more frequent bouts of depression than I normally
do. I was afraid for my family in El Salvador, and I still am afraid.
75. See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996):
[The judge had seen] no other case in which monetary damages were so inadequate to
compensate the plaintiffs for the injuries caused by a defendant ... [and that] one can
not place a dollar value on the lives lost as the result of the defendant's actions and
the suffering inflicted on the innocent victims of his cruel campaign. Unfortunately,
however, a monetary judgment is all the Court can award these plaintiffs.
76. LOBEL, supra note 61, at 8.
77. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 58, at 361.
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by torture or the extrajudicial killing of loved ones.7 8 Similarly, the
introduction of money damages may distort some of the symbolic value
of these cases and splinter a sense of solidarity among plaintiffs by
creating competition for awards among different victims and
subclasses 79 and by raising concerns about distributive justice.
80
Finally, a money damage award without any prospect of enforcement
or prospective change may ultimately not satisfy retributive impulses
and may actually undermine victims' faith in real justice or reform,
thus highlighting a latent fallacy of legal liberalism, which posits that
once rights have been granted, civil and political equality will
naturally follow.81
Taking the perspective of a plaintiffs community, while
individual suits involve the allegations of only the named plaintiffs,
such suits often manifest a representational quality8 2 and as such are
capable of accommodating a more contextual and comprehensive
consideration of repression beyond that suffered by the body and to
78. Id. at 367-68 (noting the rejection of compensation for moral wrongs); Richard L. Abel,
Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 445 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)
(noting that tort damages perpetuate the fiction that money is equivalent to harm, equate money
with human dignity and integrity, and assume that for every pain suffered, there will be an
amount that will compensate); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice
Through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DE PAUL L. REV. 417, 432-37 (2003)
(discussing the relationship between harm and money for victims of the September eleventh
attacks).
79. See Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not
Taken, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503, 522 (2002) (discussing how conflicting interests among plaintiffs
prevent class certification in some situations); Michael J. Bazyler, Essay,
www.swissbankclaims.com: The Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the
Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 64, 101 (2001) (discussing infighting among plaintiff
subclasses in Holocaust litigation).
80. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 58, at 369. This is especially true where individuals'
group identification gives rise to preferences for equal distribution, which the tort system cannot
accommodate. Hensler, supra note 78, at 424-25.
81. Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV.
863, 906-07 (1993).
82. See Center for Justice & Accountability, Carlos Mauricio's Story, at http://www.cia.org/
forSurvivors/CarlosforSurvivors.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005):
I want to be the voice for people who were never able to speak out, for those who do
not want, or are unable, to take their cases to court. Not only those who have been
tortured and never want to talk about it, but also those who were killed during
torture.
Statements by Juan Romagoza, supra note 74, at 3-4:
I felt like 1 was in a boat, in the bow of a boat. And I felt like there were many, many
people rowing behind - that they were moving me into this moment. That was the
vision that I had. And I didn't want to turn back to look. I felt that if I looked back at
them, I'd weep because I'd see them again: wounded, tortured, raped, naked, torn,
bleeding. So I didn't want to see that, I just felt their support, their strength, their
energy.
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that suffered by the body politic. This is particularly true where the
plaintiff can present evidence that she was harmed as part of a policy
or practice of human rights violations against similarly situated
individuals or where large scale human rights abuses amounting to
genocide or crimes against humanity were committed and are
proved.8 3 A favorable judgment or verdict in such situations offers a
public and official acknowledgement of rights, the stigmatization of
violations, a measure of accountability, and a symbolic break with the
past. Other victims--of the incident or regime in question and
beyond--can experience these dignitary functions of litigation
vicariously and can enjoy the reordering of social relations brought
about by a finding of liability in an ostensibly bilateral case.8 4
Where litigation proceeds as a class action, members of a
community subject to abuse theoretically have the opportunity to
participate in litigation more directly. However, the degree to which
involvement in a class provides an opportunity for class members to
experience the dignitary benefits of litigation will depend on class
counsel's willingness and ability to involve the class members and the
broader community in the suit. This requires, for example,
maintaining regular communications with members of the class, or
their more informal representatives, to apprise them of significant
developments in the case and canvass their opinions about the
direction of the litigation.8 5 Community involvement and impact in
both individual and class actions can be enhanced where plaintiffs and
their lawyers are committed to involving members of the plaintiffs
community in litigation, through press work in the country where
abuses occurred, the dissemination of educational materials,
participation in speaking engagements and the trial itself, community
outreach, partnerships with local NGOs and community leaders, and
the creation of contact lists for case updates and trial reports.
Likewise, lawyers and NGOs can develop and coordinate legal
strategies with representative groups and local leaders within the
target country's civil society who are also concerned with human
83. See, e.g., Doe v. Saravia, 2004 WL 2913256 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 24, 2004) (determining
assassination to be a crime against humanity).
84. Stephan, supra note 8, at 644 (noting expressive functions of litigation to enhance
information on the scope and meaning of legal rules, articulate moral values, and construct social
meaning for parties not before the court).
85. For a discussion of the challenges of the human rights class action, see Beth Van
Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 321-29
(2003).
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rights and the rights of victims and are in direct contact with
community members.
8 6
The potential for litigation to promote these dignitary and
truth-telling functions among plaintiffs and their communities
operates in varying degrees in the various models of human rights
litigation. These processes are most salient in the individual actions
in which the plaintiff works collaboratively with counsel to frame and
prosecute her case and where lawyer and client share a mutual
political commitment to the suit.8 7  As a case becomes more
representational, as with a class action, or where a client-centered
approach is lacking and the plaintiff is relegated to a more passive
role, as may be the case with the mass tort approach, these
intangibles may be inoperative. In particular, the appearance of
litigation techniques developed in other forms of entrepreneurial
litigation (where the attorney develops the case and then trolls for
nominal "clients")88 in ATCA class action litigation threatens to
trivialize the role of victims of human rights violations in the litigation
process. 8
9
In addition, as ATCA litigation becomes more doctrinally
focused, representational, and pecuniary, relations between lawyers
and clients become more attenuated and the risk of conflicts of
interest arises. As has been recognized in the civil rights field, where
impact litigation is ideologically motivated, the lawyer's fealty to a
particular political agenda may diminish the client's voice. 90 This
process may be subtle and unintentional, as attorneys may overlook
the growing divide between their goals and their client's interests.91
86. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 345 (1988) (noting importance
of lawyers' engaging in "continual low level mobilization of the constituency"); see also Lucie E.
White, Mobilization at the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 538 (1988) (exploring the "potential of welfare litigation to become
an occasion for the education and mobilization of poor people and their advocates.").
87. See LUBAN, supra note 86, at 324 (describing the relationship between attorney and
client as a political relationship); Loewy, supra note 12, at 1885 (discussing client-centered
approach to litigation).
88. See, e.g., Lawyers & Settlements, Legal Help-Free Case Evaluations (client
identification service for class action attorneys), at http://bigclassaction.com/ (last visited Feb. 7
2005).
89. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883-89 (1987)
(discussing risks of conflicts of interest in entrepreneurial class actions).
90. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1449 (1996); LUBAN, supra note 86, at 315, 319.
91. See Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interest in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478-79 (1975) (noting LDF's pursuit of integration




Likewise, as the pecuniary potential of these cases increases, so too
does the risk of a proliferation of poorly-framed "strike" suits against
U.S. multinationals 92 and collusive settlements that provide lucrative
attorneys' fees and broad preclusive effects at the expense of the
plaintiffs' rights to an adjudicative process.93 The regulatory system
governing class actions may not be vigorous enough to protect against
these conflicts in the human rights context, especially where members
of the class are dispersed and unorganized such that effective
monitoring of class counsel and representatives is impossible.
94
B. On Defendants and Potential Defendants
To date, ATCA-style litigation has proved limited in its ability
to produce concrete distributive justice. Many ATCA-style cases have
generated justifiably staggering judgments. However, these results
have exerted a limited impact on defendants' "bottom line" because
very few ATCA judgments have been executed upon in any
meaningful sense. 95 The persistent elusiveness of an enforceable
damage award in ATCA-style litigation renders the disjuncture
between rights and remedies in human rights litigation its most stark.
As discussed elsewhere in this Essay, the impact of ATCA-style cases
on defendants can be measured by more than simply the percentage of
favorable judgments that have been obtained and executed upon.
That said, there is no doubt that the availability of collectable
judgments will add to the rehabilitative, punitive, and deterrent
impact of these cases. To that end, the advent of the corporate cases
has generated a new optimism about the possibility of achieving an
economic recovery for victims of human rights abuses. Several cases
in particular are poised to commence trial after surviving motions to
92. Stephan, supra note 8, at 651 (noting potential for "opportunistic litigants" to use
litigation to "extort rents from vulnerable targets.").
93. See, e.g., Brian Ross, Prominent Holocaust Claims Lawyer Accused of Neglecting Clients,
ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 7, 2000) (discussing clients' concerns over class counsel's neglect), at
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82680&page= 1.
94. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 15-16 (1991); see, e.g., DaSilva v. Esmor Corr. Serv., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 477, 479-80, 484
(D.N.J. 2003) (discussing difficulties of communicating with members of the class, former asylum
seekers, many of whom had been deported from the United States).
95. Hope remains that a class of victims of Ferdinand Marcos's regime will be compensated
out of Marcos's estate. Marcos Payout Decision, GEELONG ADVERTISER (Australia), July 14, 2004,
§ World, at 20 (noting court's order to Marcos's corporation to release $40 million for
compensation to members of class).
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dismiss and summary judgment.9 6 In addition, cases brought against
individuals with strong economic and personal ties to the United
States may eventually result in economic recovery for plaintiffs.
97
Beyond monetary relief, ATCA-style cases are increasingly
seeking prospective injunctive relief, but the ATCA's full potential
here has yet to be established. While in theory cases against foreign
officials or state actors are amenable to such relief, such an effort
would be at best a purely symbolic exercise and at worst a hopeless
gesture given the difficulties of extraterritorial enforcement and the
dictates of the principle of comity. 98 In contrast, the cases against
MNCs better reflect some of the conditions for which equitable relief is
appropriate and potentially efficacious: where the entity to be enjoined
is within the court's jurisdiction, there are ongoing violations, and
there is the threat of irreparable harm (that is, where there is
extensive destruction of the natural or cultural environment). 99 To a
certain degree, U.S. courts are already experienced with this type of
extraterritorial enforcement through transnational commercial
litigation. 100 The flexibility inherent to working in equity enables
courts to balance the interests of, and constraints on, the parties in
fashioning a decree. 10 1 To be sure, courts are reluctant to issue an
injunction that cannot be enforced, 10 2 and an unenforceable decree
might undermine the legitimacy of the principle and of the judicial
process more broadly. On the other hand, enforceability is more likely
where key corporate decisions and policies are developed in, or issued
96. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241-48, 1250 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment and allowing case to go forward
on an agency or aiding and abetting theory); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 96 Civ.
8386(KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2002) (denying the majority of
defendants' motion to dismiss).
97. Two recent cases may be the first to compensate victims. In Romagoza v. Garcia,
plaintiffs obtained a $54.6 million jury verdict against defendants and have since garnished one
of the defendant's investment accounts to partially satisfy the judgment pending an appeal. See
Writ of Garnishment, Gonzales v. Garcia, Case No. 99-8364-CIV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4,
2003) (on file with the author). Likewise, in Jean v. Dorelian, plaintiffs were able to restrain the
payment of lottery proceeds to a defendant while the case proceeded against him. See Jean v.
Dorelian, Case No. 03-21061 CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2003) (order granting leave to file
second amended complaint and temporary restraining order) (on file with the author).
98. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that some
plaintiffs in the consolidated case sought to enjoin defendant, the leader of the Bosnian-Serb
military in the early 1990s, from committing "genocidal acts, torture, extrajudicial killing, and
other violations of the law of nations.").
99. Sarah Light, The Human Rights Injunction: Equitable Remedies under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 653, 678 (1999).
100. Id. at 668-69.
101. Chayes, supra note 13, at 1298 (noting that the decree in public law litigation is often
the result of a three-way negotiation between the courts and the parties).
102. Developments in the Law-Injunction, 78 HARV. L. REV. 996, 1012 (1965).
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from, this country, 0 3 or where parent companies exercise control over
foreign subsidiaries.
10 4
Accordingly, plaintiffs in the corporate cases have increasingly
sought judicial directives governing MNCs' foreign investment
policies, relations with their host governments, offshore production
arrangements, project security measures, environmental policies, and
labor relations. This approach inevitably envisions a more lasting role
for courts in the implementation and supervision of remedies geared
toward future behavior and invites courts to address the social and
economic conditions in developing countries that threaten human
rights values. Thus, the potential to obtain injunctive relief against
MNCs may provide a way to indirectly reform governmental policies,
where MNCs are compelled to condition investment on improvements
in human rights conditions in response to a decree or in order to avoid
vicarious liability.
For example, in Doe v. Unocal, plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief in the form of an order compelling Unocal to terminate its
participation in a joint petroleum enterprise with the government of
Burma/Myanmar. 10 5  Plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief was
adjudicated in connection with their motion for class certification
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). 106 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had
not demonstrated that the relief sought would eliminate the abuses
alleged, because it was the government that was committing the
abuses, other oil companies would simply take Unocal's place upon the
company's withdrawal, and the construction of the pipeline was
substantially completed. 10 7 In this case, injunctive relief might have
been more readily available had plaintiffs sought to compel conduct
more capable of judicial oversight and concerning Unocal's ongoing
activities in Burma, such as the creation of a corporate monitoring
process to guarantee that forced labor and forced relocation would not
be employed in finalizing or maintaining the pipeline project or an
103. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, *11-*12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
11, 1994) (noting that dismissal for forum non conveniens was less inappropriate when plaintiffs
sought an injunction and challenged events were initiated in this country).
104. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000) (seeking
to hold parent company liable for actions of foreign subsidiary); Villeda v. Del Monte, 305 F.
Supp. 2d 1285, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim against company and its foreign
subsidiaries).
105. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
106. Rule 23(b)(2) allows for class treatment if "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
107. Unocal Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47.
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injunction against using Burmese military or police forces to provide
pipeline security.
As jurisprudence under the ATCA has become more robust, the
genuine threat of legal entitlement increasingly presents the
necessary predicate for settlement negotiations. To be sure, some
human rights advocates and victims will undoubtedly insist on a full
trial on the merits in order to provide a forum for the exposure of
rights violations and to create a public record of abuses. In addition,
defendants may resist settlement out of fear that it will be perceived
as a concession of responsibility for human rights violations. That
said, given the arrival of class action attorneys on the human rights
litigation scene, settlement is now more than ever a possible outcome
for ATCA-style cases.108 Indeed, in a momentous development, Unocal
Corp. recently settled an ATCA case arising out of its pipeline project
in Burma 0 9 for a reported $30 million, which will go to named
plaintiffs and the creation of a fund to improve living conditions in the
region. 110 Likewise, many of the historical justice cases arising out of
the abuses of World War II led to comprehensive settlements,"11 which
are no doubt a model for other more recent historical justice cases
seeking apartheid and slavery reparations from corporate
defendants.
112
Where lawyers are attuned to the interests of their clients, the
settlement of ATCA-style cases can generate some of the multifaceted
results victims of human rights abuses may seek from impact
litigation. In particular, settlement agreements can be crafted to
involve more than money damages-which may simply enable
defendants to internalize the "costs" of rights abuses-and to institute
protections against repeat abuses. For example, U.S. retailers
108. See Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 2041 (noting that Texaco reportedly
offered a $500 million settlement to the plaintiffs in a human rights suit involving its operations
in Ecuador).
109. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment); rev'd, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-
56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, *35-38 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), en banc review
granted, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2716, *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
110. See Paul Magnusson, A Milestone For Human Rights, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2005) at
63 (discussing settlement).
111. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See
generally MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN
AMERICA'S COURTS (2003); JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE: INSIDE
THE EPIC BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2002) (analyzing the efforts of Holocaust
victims to secure reparations).
112. See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Khulumani v. Barclays Nat'l Bank, Ltd. (Nov.
11, 2001), available at http://www.cmht.com/casewatch/cases/apartheid-cmpl.pdf.
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contracting with manufacturers on Saipan recently created an $8
million fund as part of a settlement of claims brought against them
under the ATCA and other domestic laws to finance a monitoring
program to ensure compliance with labor laws, provide partial
damages, fund public educational programs, and defray litigation
costs.113
Even short of a full settlement, the commencement of litigation
may make possible discussions between parties that were foreclosed
by power inequalities in place prior to the filing of suit. Indeed, the
very filing of the suit can provide a "foot in the door" to communicate
with a defendant corporation that may have otherwise dismissed the
demands of victims and activists. However, where the legal
entitlement is insufficient, defendants may have no incentive to
negotiate with plaintiffs and may instead become more entrenched in
their opposition to the suit. For example, in the slavery reparations
suit, defendants were able to evade mediation, which plaintiffs no
doubt sought as a step toward settlement. In denying plaintiffs'
request for mandatory mediation, the court noted that even if it were
empowered to order mandatory mediation, the claims at issue were
not likely to be resolved through such a mechanism. 114
Apart from these formal outcomes, it is possible to conceive of
more intangible impacts of ATCA-style litigation on defendants and
potential defendants. An increasingly important goal of the human
rights movement is to deny impunity to human rights violators for
their actions.115 A trial provides the ultimate vehicle for individual
accountability. 116 Indeed, the very act of filing suit against an alleged
perpetrator provides a measure of accountability for rights violations.
At a minimum, defendants' lives are disrupted while they are forced to
either defend their actions, often at considerable cost, or accept a
default judgment. Of the individual defendants sued in ATCA-style
litigation, only a handful have ultimately remained in the United
113. Deborah J. Karet, Comment, Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment Industry?, 48
BUFFALO L. REV. 1047, 1080-85 (2000).
114. In re African-American Slave Descendants' Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
115. Early efforts to promote international human rights norms focused on state compliance
with the various human rights treaties. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (setting forth standards to gauge, and institutions to monitor, state compliance).
However, since Fildrtiga and the establishment of the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, human rights advocates are increasingly focused on finding ways to hold individual
perpetrators accountable for their actions and to provide redress to victims of rights abuses.
116. Jonathan Bush, Book Review Essay: Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its
Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2066 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)).
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States.1 17 Even if defendants can return to their countries of origin,
the existence of a lawsuit against them in the United States can
complicate their reintegration and ensure perpetual stigmatization 1 8
as an alleged or adjudicated human rights abuser. 119
Civil litigation in the U.S. can never provide a full accounting
for human rights violations worldwide, because certain defendants
will, remain beyond the reach of U.S. courts. 120 Thus, human rights
cases in U.S. courts will inevitably remain exemplary. While cases
involving single defendants may not entirely encapsulate the systemic
and complicitous nature of human rights atrocities,' 2' they
nonetheless "loom large in significance as markers of
accountability."'122 A plaintiffs verdict in the civil context assigns
legal and moral responsibility for violations, even where a default is
obtained or the judgment remains unexecuted. Thus, each individual
case has the potential to chip away-one defendant at a time-at the
edifice of impunity that has until relatively recently characterized
human rights enforcement.
117. Coliver, supra note 36. At least seventeen defendants have been sued successfully in the
U.S., four since 2001. Of those, five fled the U.S. once suits were filed, and these five had their
lives "substantially disrupted." Id. Of those defendants who remained in the United States,
several have been subject to deportation proceedings. For example, Juan Grijalba, a general in
the Honduran army, was sued for abuses committed by his subordinates and is awaiting
deportation. Alfonso Chardy, Ruling Details Torture Claim, MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 2004,
available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/miamiherald/newslocal/8966242.htm?lc.
Likewise, Kelbessa Negewo, an Ethiopian found liable for torture in an ATCA proceeding,
recently gave up his U.S. citizenship on the eve of the commencement of denaturalization
proceedings against him. Cameron McWhirter, Accused Torturer Cedes Citizenship, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Oct. 21, 2004. at 6C. Negewo was later arrested and faces deportation. Harry Weber,
Ethiopian Torture Suspect Arrested in Ga., GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,1282,-4710656,00.html.
118. Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 1962 (noting that stigma associated with
being identified as a rights abuser can discredit individuals and undermine their political
influence).
119. For example, Hector Gramajo, a general in the Guatemalan military, was grooming
himself to run for presidency while obtaining a degree at Harvard University's Kennedy School
of Government. After being served with the lawsuit (at his graduation), he defaulted, returned
to Guatemala, had his visa revoked, was disinvited to a major U.S. conference, and his party did
not choose him as its presidential candidate. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 10, 22-23; Robert
Collier, Bay Area Guatemalans Vindicated by Verdict, S.F. CHRON., April 26, 1995, at A9 (noting
ramifications of suit against Gramajo).
120. See Doe v. Unocal Corp, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179 (C. D. Cal. 1998), a/l'd, 248 F.3d 915
(9th Cir. 2001) (dismissing French company Total from suit for lack of personal jurisdiction);
Byung Wha An v. Doo-Hwan Chun, Case No. 96-35971, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303, *4-6 (9th
Cir. Jan. 28, 1998) (finding defendants' contacts in the forum were insufficiently continuous and
systematic to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over them).
121. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 9 (1998).
122. Russell, supra note 15, at 1253.
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This accountability rationale is different from, and indeed more
modest than, a traditional deterrence rationale for litigation. Without
some measure of deterrence-such as dissuading those who might
perpetrate such atrocities in the future-the effect of a plaintiffs
judgment may be limited to retrospective condemnation with little
prospective effect. In the human rights context, the deterrent effect of
ATCA-style litigation remains speculative. 123 Even at the level of the
specific deterrence, there is no guarantee against recidivism by a
particular perpetrator, especially given the unavailability of
incapacitation by incarceration. Although they are high profile, ATCA
cases may be too episodic to exert a more general deterrent effect in
the classical sense where defendants "weigh" the costs of injury
against the "perceived" benefit of the prohibited activities. 124 As a
result, it might be a stretch to postulate that, at this point in time, the
existence of the ATCA or the potential to be sued in the United States
exerts any sort of generalized deterrent function on potential human
rights abusers.1 25 And, even assuming the most robust enforcement,
these cases involve extreme conduct that is perhaps less amenable to
formal processes of deterrence.
That said, the threat of suit undoubtedly registers some impact
on potential defendants and abusers. At a minimum, this threat will
keep some rights violators from traveling to the United States and
may prevent this country from operating as a safe haven for abusers
to raise or invest funds visit family members, obtain educational
opportunities or medical care, vacation, or retire. 126 Political leaders,
who may be more likely to calculate the costs and benefits of ordering
or encouraging rights abuses, may be more susceptible to processes of
deterrence if they are concerned about preserving their political
viability. The threat of suit may also exert reformative pressure on
MNCs-many of them publicly traded-to adjust their behavior to
avoid suit.127 Indeed, a cottage industry of sorts has developed to
123. See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 973-78 (1966) (noting difficulty of proving deterrence empirically).
124. Id. at 960, 961.
125. Stephan, supra note 8, at 650 (noting that "without effective coercion the prospects for
deterrence seem dim."). But see Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 31 (2001) (positing a deterrent function of
international criminal justice).
126. See Bernardo Valiente, Militaires Piden Preservar Amnistfa, LA PRENSA GRAFICA (San
Salvador), Feb. 14, 2004, at 16 (quoting a military officer complaining that he cannot travel to
the United States because of the cases against high ranking Salvadorans).
127. Indeed, Canadian oil company Talisman Energy recently sold its stake in a Sudanese oil
project in the face of coordinated pressure from shareholders, activists, an ATCA lawsuit, see
infra note 166, and potential exclusion from U.S. capital markets.
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advise corporations on doing business in repressive political
environments without incurring potential human rights liability.12
8
The reverberations generated by a single damage award
against a corporate defendant or costly settlement may be enough to
provoke reform across a number of industries and even persuade
multinationals to avoid relationships with repressive governments
entirely. 129 Such an award will operate as a form of judicially-imposed
"secondary sanction"130 that may compel foreign governments to
improve their rights records in order to attract continued investment
and involvement by multinationals.
As a worldwide system of accountability for rights violations
becomes more established, comprehensive and rigorous, the deterrent
power of international human rights law becomes more realistic.
Indeed, international, quasi-international or hybrid, regional, and
domestic judicial systems are increasingly working in tandem to
ensure that individuals are held legally accountable for their actions
and victims have fora in which to seek meaningful legal redress. 13'
This "community of courts"'132  is gradually establishing a
complementary division of labor, whereby international and quasi-
international tribunals prosecute high-level defendants accused of
128. For example, Verit6 is "an independent, non-profit social auditing and research
organization . . . [whose] mission is to ensure that people worldwide work under safe, fair and
legal working conditions." Verit6, About Us, Our Mission, at http://verite.org/aboutus/main.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). "[When] Verit6 auditors identify the exploitation of workers or health
and safety violations in the workplace, [they] develop concrete steps to correct them through a
combination of trainings for management and workers, education programs and remediation
programs." Id. Their "experience and links with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) span
over 65 countries, with regionally-based coordinators overseeing operations throughout Asia,
Latin America, Africa, the United States and Europe." Id. In addition, World Monitors "is a
consulting group based in New York City that provides expertise to multinational companies,
non-governmental and multilateral organizations seeking to align their business practices with
human rights standards around the world." World Monitors, Inc., at http://www.
worldmonitors.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
129. See Birchall, supra note 45, at 13 (noting that "Unocal's settlement in principle also
increases pressure on several other energy companies facing similar cases that have survived
motions to dismiss - including ChevronTexaco, Shell and Talisman oil.").
130. Robert J. Peterson, Political Realism and the Judicial Imposition of International
Secondary Sanctions: Possibilities from John Doe v. Unocal and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 5 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 277, 292-94 (1998) (discussing the way in which ATCA cases represent
a potential form of secondary sanction against repressive governments).
131. See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 75-97 (2002) (discussing development of
international and domestic courts with overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions).
132. Lawrence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 372 (1997) (calling attention to "a community of
courts around the world, units engaged in a common endeavor.").
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mass crimes and rely on national courts to prosecute (civilly or
criminally) the lesser perpetrators within their jurisdictional reach.
To be sure, retributive goals may be better achieved through
criminal processes and penalties, where defendants are more directly
subject to the power of the state, than through civil processes.
Nonetheless, domestic civil litigation in the U.S. plays a part where
criminal prosecutions are not feasible or forthcoming and where
perpetrators are subject to personal jurisdiction here. By exposing the
whereabouts of abusers, civil suits can spur or shame the U.S.
government into invoking administrative 133 and/or criminal remedies
against identified perpetrators. 134 For example, information gathered
in connection with civil lawsuits has assisted the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly the Immigration
and Naturalization Service) in pursuing actions against abusers for
visa fraud. 135 Likewise, the commencement of civil litigation in the
U.S. can trigger similar judicial responses in the home countries of
defendants.
136
C. On the Human Rights Corpus
Human rights cases under the ATCA generate a form of
declaratory relief either explicitly, where such relief is expressly
sought by plaintiffs, 137 or implicitly, through norm enunciation and
133. For example, aliens can be prosecuted for misrepresenting material facts during
immigration proceedings, including involvement in human rights abuses. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325
(a), 1001 (2004) (criminalizing false statements to government);§§ 1546, 1426 (criminalizing
misuse of immigration documents); see, e.g., Shelley Murphy, US Indicts War Crimes Suspect:
Peabody Man Accused Of Immigration Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2004, at B1 (discussing
immigration fraud charges brought against a former soldier in the Bosnian Serb army accused of
participating in the Srebrenica massacre).
134. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000) (providing criminal penalties for acts of torture
committed overseas).
135. For example, a civil suit was recently brought against a Honduran military intelligence
officer detained in connection with deportation proceedings. The information gathered in the
civil case strengthened the U.S. government's case for deportation. The Center for Justice &
Accountability, Cases, Honduras: Juan Lopez Grijalba, at http://www.cja.org/cases/grijalba.shtml
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
136. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 21; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 315 (2001) (noting that exposure
of Argentine general prompted Argentina to seek his extradition and continue judicial processes
against him). For example, once Total S.A. was dismissed from a suit in the United States on
personal jurisdiction grounds, see supra note 120, a suit was commenced against it in France.
See International Federation for Human Rights, La FIDH et Son Afflide Francaise la LDH
Soutiennent la Plainte Ddposj en France Contre les Dirigeants de Total, Aug. 29, 2002, at
http://www.fidh.org/communiq/2002fbu2908f.htm.
137. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Doe v. Unocal
Corp., Case No. 96-6959 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1996) (on file with the author).
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confirmation. 138 By invoking international human rights within the
traditional legalist paradigm, cases brought under the ATCA can
transform the abstract and at times hortatory rights cataloged in the
various international declarations, covenants and treaties into
enforceable legal claims and in so doing give concrete meaning to
human rights values 139 and contribute to long-term processes of moral
inculcation. 140 This expressive function was particularly important in
the early life of these cases, where the justiciability of the norms
themselves was uncertain.141 This transformative potential remains
of value, even apart from formal outcomes, because it may advance
broader strategic goals, such as laying the foundation for future
suitS1 42 and codification efforts, providing a more comprehensive and
concrete set of guidelines for conduct, conveying a legal consensus
regarding appropriate behavior, and providing a basis for negotiation
from legal principles. 143 Additionally, adjudications involving the
personal testimony of victims and concrete facts can add meaning to
rights framed in general or abstract terms - such as with the
prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment that have been the subject of intense discussion in the wake
of the Abu Ghraib revelations.1 44 Thus, judicial pronouncements
concerning overseas abuses contribute to the domestication of
international norms that can be applied to local violations and aid in
the interpretation of U.S. statutes. 45 Even where cases are dismissed
138. Even an unenforceable injunction provides a form of declaratory relief, which may be of
value where fundamental human rights are at issue. Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at
1012-13 (noting that courts are more willing to issue injunctions to protect constitutional rights
despite challenges of discovering or punishing violations).
139. Fiss, supra note 29, at 11; Stephan, supra note 8, at 635 (noting U.S.'s leadership role in
developing international law).
140. Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 1966.
141. For example, in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, the court recognized the justiciability of the tort
of "involuntary disappearance." 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (dismissing
disappearance count), on reconsid., 694 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (reinstating and
clarifying disappearance claim).
142. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1194-96 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(recognizing the cognizability of systemic racial discrimination under the ATCA, but dismissing
case on political question grounds).
143. Koh, supra note 3, at 2369 (noting that plaintiffs are seeking "judicial declarations of
judicial wrongfulness, declarations that they could then use to convert principle into political
power").
144. An ATCA suit has already been filed against private contractors operating in Iraq
seeking an injunction against further interrogations until they have instituted proper training in
conducting interrogations free of torture. Second Amended Complaint, Saleh v. Titan (S.D. Cal.
July 30, 2004) (No. 04 CV 1143), available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/docs/Saleh%20v%20
Titan%20Corp%20Second%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf.
145. Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656-57
(1997).
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on other grounds, a court's discussion of the scope or content of
particular norms is a "norm-affirming event"'146 that may avow
plaintiffs moral claims even where legal claims are found to be not
actionable. 147 This function of human rights litigation finds affinity in
the Brown paradigm; the first Brown opinion simply announced the
principle that separate was inherently unequal, without mandating a
remedy. Indeed, given the ambivalent results of the
desegregation/integration experiment occasioned by Brown, the
announcement of this principle may be Brown's most lasting
achievement.
148
Litigation's emphasis on those rights that are deemed
justiciable has the potential to influence, and potentially distort, the
normative development of the international human rights corpus.
U.S. courts adjudicating ATCA cases have consistently identified a
narrow category of civil and political rights that constitute "torts in
violation of international law" as is required by the statute. 149 In so
doing, the courts have determined that other civil and political rights
and most economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC)-such as the
right to a clean environment, to health, or to cultural expression-are
not amenable to judicial enforcement. To date, finding defensible and
justiciable "proxies" for ESC rights150 has proven unsuccessful. 151 This
will inevitably limit the ability of ATCA-style suits to reach
destructive corporate behavior, because these rights are most often
implicated by corporate policies and practices in developing
146. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 4.
147. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 248 (D.N.J. 1999):
Every human instinct yearns to remediate in some way the immeasurable wrongs
afflicted upon so many millions of people by Nazi Germany so many years ago, wrongs
in which corporate Germany unquestionably participated. For the reasons set forth
above, however, this court does not have the power to engage in such remediation.
148. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 268 (2d ed. 1986). Others, however, have argued that the Court did not go far
enough in its declarative rhetoric in linking segregation with attitudes of white supremacy.
Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does it Matter What the Court said in Brown?, 81 TEX. L. REv.
305, 312 (2002).
149. See supra note 47.
150. See generally Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000) (theorizing causes of action for
massive environmental destruction under the right to life, the right to a healthy environment,
the prohibition of apartheid, etc.).
151. For example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the court ruled that plaintiffs'
allegations that Freeport mining company engaged in acts of "cultural genocide" and
environmental torts that destroyed an Indonesian indigenous group's unique cultural identity
and ability to sustain itself were not cognizable under the ATCA as "torts in violation of the laws
of nations." 969 F. Supp. 362, 373, 382 (E.D. La. 1997).
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countries. 152  Nonetheless, plaintiffs continue to file such claims,
which has entrenched a series of negative rulings that may delay or
preclude the future justiciability of these norms.153 In addition, the
human rights corpus has its roots in political liberalism and its
preoccupation with the protection of the autonomous individual
against incursions by the state. Thus, many human rights norms are
defined or framed in terms of state action. 154 As a result, human
rights litigation cannot reach certain forms of violence emanating
from private actors, which in certain contexts provides a greater
threat to individuals than state-sponsored violence.
This privileging by the litigation process of certain human
rights over others has the potential to subordinate ESC rights that
may be of equal or even greater concern to plaintiffs, who may desire
above all a greater share in the development potential of their
countries. This emphasis may also mask the extent to which rights
violations are intertwined with-or a product of-underdevelopment,
economic exclusion, discriminatory resource allocations,
neocolonialism, and corporate exploitation. 155  Thus, ATCA-style
litigation may be powerless in addressing the root causes of rights
violations or in promoting a social justice agenda that may do more
toward improving the lives of victim communities on a day-to-day
basis and that thus may be a higher priority among plaintiff classes.
A reliance on litigation to enforce the corpus of international
human rights also invokes a more fundamental critique about the
efficacy of a rights-based discourse in achieving social change.
156
According to this perspective, not all reform goals "can be presented in
the name of rights."'157 The rhetoric of rights forces a desiccation and
abstraction of real life experience by obliging plaintiffs to mould their
152. Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 2027-28 (cataloging the ways in which
corporations can interfere with ESC rights in developing countries).
153. See, e.g., In re South Africa Apartheid Litigation, 02 M.D.L. 1499, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23944, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. November 29, 2004) (failing to find aiding and abetting liability
under international law); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.2d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding no jurisdiction over environmental law claims even when framed in terms of a right to
life or health).
154. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex 39, Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1984) (defining torture in terms of state action).
155. RHODA E. HOWARD, Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 159, 161 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng
eds., 1990).
156. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1350 (1988) (arguing that
rights discourse is incompatible with social change toward substantive equality).
157. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 11.
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lived experiences in terms of available legal rights and remedies. In
so doing, plaintiffs may lose sight of real objectives as their visions for
the reform and rehabilitation of society become "trapped" in the
language of law. 158  Given the subordination of ESC rights in
particular, plaintiffs may only advance a limited number of atomistic
claims, which may be at odds with how communities view themselves
and the harms suffered. 159 Indeed, potential plaintiffs may care more
about damage to their communities' ways of life, a concern that ATCA
litigation cannot accommodate except minimally through the class
action mechanism, which is an imperfect arbiter of group rights.
Nonetheless, victims often view their experience in terms of a denial of
rights, 160 and thus the rhetoric of rights possesses a powerful symbolic
meaning for plaintiffs and other victims. 161
D. On Other Processes of Social Change
The impact of human rights litigation in the United States in
countries where abuses occur also remains unproven. Such litigation
inevitably proceeds alongside other processes of social change, and the
relationship between the two is a complex one-at times synergistic
and antagonistic. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
positive impact of such cases on the expansion of the human rights
movement and in countries where abuses have occurred and beyond is
growing. 162
Litigation as a visible, public, and "newsworthy" phenomenon
can serve an educative function, by teaching the general public about
international norms of behavior, calling attention to injustices,
persuading changes of opinion, provoking a public outcry, and
mobilizing grassroots campaigns. 163 Within the U.S., press accounts of
158. Crenshaw, supra note 156, at 1354.
159. Magee, supra note 81, at 907 (noting that "remedies law has traditionally ignored
group-claims theory, despite historical practices amounting to group-based injury").
160. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 402, 405 (1987).
161. Dean Hill Rivkin, Reflections on Lawyering for Reform: Is the Highway Alive Tonight?,
64 TENN. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1997).
162. But see Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 19-20 (positing no impact of early cases).
163. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 7-8 (noting extrajudicial influences of court action). For
example, the ATCA case against Coca-Cola has given rise to a consumer campaign against the
company led by Corporate Campaign, Inc. (an organization dedicated to promoting labor issues
by, among other things, launching media and consumer campaigns). See International Labor
Rights Fund Campaign to Stop Killer Coke (a campaign dedicated to stopping a cycle of murders
involving union leaders at Coca-Cola bottling plants in South America), at http://www.
killercoke.org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); Coke Watch (same), at http://www.cokewatch.org/ (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005); Collingsworth, supra note 62, at 193 (noting the Coca-Cola litigation has
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the extent of repression elsewhere, and even direct participation in the
judicial process by individual jurors, can generate a societal empathy
for human rights victims, 164 thus contributing to a domestic human
rights consciousness and the development of a political constituency
supportive of an ethical foreign policy. 165 Greater domestic attention
to rights abuses occurring overseas will increase pressure on the U.S.
government to condemn abuses and bring its influence to bear on
repressive governments.
166
While ATCA-style litigation takes place in the United States,
the audience for these suits-and thus their educative reach-is
international. Even when pursued in a foreign forum, litigation can
provide a community mobilizing and organizing tool for victims of
rights violations and their supporters in the implicated country and
empower local activists with "hope and inspiration"'1 7 by changing
"the limits of the possible." 168  Litigation here can also lead to the
development of transnational advocacy networks by connecting exile
communities with groups in the target country. 169 In the class action
context, the process of defining, providing notice to, and
communicating with the class can identify, activate, and join
individuals who have been similarly injured and foster a sense of
solidarity, shared identity, and political power. Especially where
organizations representing victims or working to enforce human rights
in the target countries initiate or support litigation here as part of a
coordinated strategy, 170 litigation can bolster domestic and grassroots
created a broader campaign aimed at forcing the company to publicly denounce the violence in
Colombia).
164. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and The Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101-02 (1989) (discussing empathy and empathetic
capacity).
165. See, e.g., Peter Waldman, Evangelicals Give U.S. Foreign Policy An Activist Tinge, WALL
ST. J., May 26, 2004, at Al (noting influence of evangelical lobbying groups on legislation
addressing religious persecution and other rights violations abroad).
166. See Concurrent Resolution Declaring Genocide in Darfur, Sudan, H.R. Con. Res. 467,
108th Cong. (2004) (enacted). Events in Sudan are the subject of a lawsuit against a Canadian
oil company. See Presbyterian Church of the Sudan v. Talisman Energy, No. 01 Civ. 988.2 (AGS),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3981 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003).
167. Matsuda, supra note 60, at 349; see Statements by Juan Romagoza, supra note 74, at 2:
I feel that it was the right thing to do, to bring the case. It is not that hope is stronger
than fear, because at times the fear is very strong, but people think now that there's a
chance for justice. It feels to me like a collective communion, that people feel some
kind of joy or hope that something new can come out of this case.
168. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 140, at 315.
169. See generally M.E. Keck & K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (1998).
170. See Collingsworth, supra note 62, at 187, 192 (noting that labor union representing
workers at a Colombian Coca-Cola plant asked an affiliated labor union in the U.S. to file a
complaint in the Southern District of Florida against Coca-Cola on their behalf).
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efforts to address ongoing human rights violations. Thus an
opportune case with good press and other penetration in the
implicated country 171 can provoke civil deliberation about rights
abuses 172 and catalyze or otherwise undergird moral, legal, and
political challenges to mechanisms that may have been put in place-
such as amnesty laws-to shield perpetrators from liability for past
abuses in their home countries and end a conspiracy of silence about
abuses. 17
3
Thus, litigation here can bring about a "breakthrough
moment"'174 in the target country and contribute to societal processes
of communal rehabilitation, forgiveness, accountability, and
reconciliation that underlie other efforts at transitional justice.175 In
these ways, the commencement of litigation, even in a foreign forum,
can create "cascade effects" in the nation where the abuses occurred
and beyond that may signal more durable social change. 176 These
processes may only be effective, of course, where the foreign state is
receptive to them, such as where political power has shifted away from
a repressive government or where a domestic human rights
constituency has gained a measure of political power and
momentum. 177 By contrast, where abuses continue, the potential for
an adversarial process to bring about reconciliation or repentance is
more limited.
A complex dialectic exists between litigation and legislative
processes. It has been long theorized that majoritarian victories
171. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 19 (arguing that early ATCA-style cases produced
little impact in the countries implicated because the proceedings were not widely publicized).
172. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 136, at 316 (noting that cases make abuses a topic of
national conversation).
173. For example, several lawsuits in the United States against former members of the
Salvadoran military, including a co-conspirator in the assassination of Archbishop Romero, have
prompted a national conversation and debate in El Salvador concerning the amnesty laws
enacted to insulate members of the military from legal responsibility. Coliver, supra note 36;
Daniel Valencia, Saca Considera Necesaria la "Ley de Amnistia para la Consolidaci6n de la Paz"
(discussing potential repeal of amnesty law), at http://www.diariocolatino.comlnacionales/
detalles.asp?NewsID=3605 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). An English version of the article is
available at: http://www.crispaz.org/news/list/2004/0313.htm.
174. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1012 ("Breakthrough moments in law occur rarely but not
randomly, regardless of arena. They usually follow long periods of incremental, often nearly
imperceptible, social change occurring at a glacial pace. When they do occur, they crystallize
what has gone before at the same instant that they propel social structures forward.").
175. See generally MINOW, supra note 121 (discussing processes of transitional justice).
176. Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 8; see, e.g., Stacie Jonas, The Ripple Effect of the
Pinochet Case, 11 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 36 (Spring 2004) (discussing the vast impact of the Pinochet
case in Chile).
177. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 19, at 31-32 (identifying factors that enhance impact of
foreign judicial processes).
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through the political process may be more effective than judicial
victories in provoking the kind of "cultural shifts" or transformation of
norms and practices necessary to invoke more lasting social change.
178
That said, critiques of using litigation to provoke systemic change
often assume an ability to participate effectively - and ultimately to
win - in the legislative arena, 179 which may not be the case in the
human rights context. Indeed, individuals often turn to the courts
where legislative bodies are unresponsive or to correct pathologies in
the political process. 80 Litigation in the United States can thus
provide an outlet for political action where legislative options for
seeking reform in countries where violations are occurring are
unavailing. Thus, litigation in the United States presents a more
viable option where no political constituency exists in implicated
countries, as where victims of human rights violations are members of
minority groups without effective political representation or capacity.
Litigation here is also available where political institutions in the
country in question are ineffective or lacking entirely' 8' or where it is
simply too dangerous for victims and their advocates to press claims
politically or legally. 8 2  Indeed, where people are dying, it is
unreasonable to wait for domestic political processes to function if
other outlets to expose abuses are available.
Where political processes are operative, an opportune lawsuit
may create an environment where legislative action and more broad-
based public engagement and discourse become possible, like an
"icebreaker through a frozen sea.' 8 3  The reparative legislative
response to the coram nobis cases brought on behalf of survivors of the
WWII Japanese internment in the United States 8 4 provides a model
178. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 980 (1997); Hunter, supra note 4, at 1012.
179. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1011.
180. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 4.
181. White, supra note 86, at 538. The role of litigation as a form of political action has been
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with civil rights litigation. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) ("Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their
objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. Just as it was true of the opponents
of New Deal legislation during the 1930's, for example, no less is it true of the Negro minority
today. And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.") (footnotes omitted).
182. See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that victims,
lawyers, and judges involved in lawsuits against Paraguay's security forces had been threatened
and killed, and efforts to prosecute offenders were routinely sabotaged).
183. Jack Greenberg, Remarks Before the Bar Association of San Francisco for the 50th
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education (May 6, 2004).
184. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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for the type of political leverage a lawsuit can generate,18 5 although
such outcomes may be equally attributable to political expediency or
processes of interest convergence.18 6 Litigation in the United States
can also prompt more systemic interventions by other branches of
government in implicated countries and provide "cover" for
progressive members of society and in government to push for reform
internally. 8 7 Litigation in one forum may also generate changes in
foreign policies elsewhere toward repressive states. Indeed, the
Fildrtiga model has been cited in connection with burgeoning efforts
to hold human rights -abusers liable in domestic courts in Europe and
elsewhere. 188
For example, several groups of plaintiffs filed class action suits
in the United States against Texaco alleging environmental harm in
Ecuador and Peru in connection with its oil extraction projects there.
The cases were dismissed on comity and forum non conveniens
grounds, which involved a determination that the courts in Ecuador
could handle the suit.'8 9 Originally, Ecuador opposed the suit, but
after a change of government, it sought to intervene in support of
plaintiffs. 90 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded, in
part on the grounds that Texaco was not required to submit to
jurisdiction in Ecuador and because the district court had
insufficiently considered the government's change of position vis-a-vis
the litigation.' 9 ' On remand, the case was again dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds. 192 The suit is currently in trial in Ecuador. 193
Litigation in United States courts also provides an outlet for
U.S.-based human rights activists, given that domestic legislative
185. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 510 (1998) (suggesting reparations claims may help focus
"community education and political organizing efforts.").
186. See generally Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 532-34 (1980) (noting legal and political explanations for the
Brown decision).
187. This process of bypassing domestic remedies to pursue international options that will in
turn pressure domestic processes has been termed a "boomerang pattern." Lutz and Sikkink,
supra note 19, at 4.
188. See Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance at 13-25, Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) (discussing influence of Fildrtiga
precedent in domestic and international fora), at http://www.nosafehaven.orglIegal/atca.pro-
IntntnlJurSuppAffirm.pdf.
189. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
190. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
191. Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153, 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1998).
192. Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.
2002).
193. See Amy Taxin, Chevron Demands Petroecuador Pay Cost from Lawsuit, REUTERS
LIMITED, June 15, 2004.
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strategies to address violations abroad are limited and often of limited
efficacy. 194  Victims and their advocates may not constitute a viable
constituency or may-by virtue of their refugee or immigrant status-
lack the political voice or economic resources to be heard effectively.
To the extent that victims can mobilize political capacity here and
partner with sympathetic supporters, 195 calls for trade sanctions and
embargoes, contingent economic aid, and diplomatic denouncements
often go unheeded and, where implemented, often manifest varying
degrees of effectiveness.1 96 With respect to domestic legislation that
may regulate the conduct of U.S. MNCs operating abroad, legal action
can "counterbalance" the power certain defendants may exercise over
political processes. 97  For example, Sweatshop Watch initiated
litigation in the Northern Mariana Islands concerning United States
retailers' labor practices there after efforts by unions to utilize
political strategies had failed.198
Although litigation can provoke and promote other processes of
social change, it can also inhibit the development of, deflect attention
194. The passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") as a companion to, and
expansion of, the ATCA, represents an important legislative victory in the United States for
human rights activists. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The TVPA was enacted in part to implement
the United States' obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment of Punishment, but also as a legislative response to a concurring
opinion in an early ATCA case challenging the use of the ATCA in human rights litigation, see
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that Congress sought
to reaffirm the line of cases inaugurated by Fildrtiga in the face of judicial resistance. See
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, H.R. REP. No. 102-367 pt 1, at 3 (1991); The Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-4, 5 (1991) ('The TVPA would establish
an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under [the
ATCA], which permits Federal district courts to hear claims by aliens for torts committed 'in
violation of the law of nations."'). In addition, the TVPA expanded the reach of the ATCA by
allowing suits by United States citizens in addition to noncitizens.
195. Other examples of domestic human rights legislation include: the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (providing protection to victims of
trafficking and enabling prosecution of traffickers); the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-236, § 572(a), 108 Stat. 486, 486-87 (1994) (providing for research into the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge period with an eye toward prosecuting responsible individuals); The Sudan Peace
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, § 11, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (requiring Secretary of State to collect
information on incidents of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan).
196. The United States has imposed sanctions on BurmalMyanmar in response to that
country's human rights record. However, evidence is slight that sanctions have led to an
improvement in the country's rights record. BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T. OF STATE, CONDITIONS IN BURMA AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA FOR THE PERIOD
SEPTEMBER 28, 2003 - MARCH 27, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/31335.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005).
197. Karet, supra note 113, at 1050.
198. See JOANNIE C. CHANG & NIKKI F. BAS, SWEATSHOP WATCH, WHO WINS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY?, at http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/headlines/2004/globaljanO4.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005).
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and resources away from, or even undermine other strategies for
social change that may be more efficacious or durable. These
alternative strategies include reparations strategies through the
political process;' 99 direct action; transnational advocacy in countries
where abuses are prevalent; 200 grassroots educational campaigns;
traditional human rights advocacy based upon fact-gathering and
shaming; the development of monitoring bodies and international
regulatory standards, such as environmental or labor codes of conduct
for extraterritorial activities;20 1 and the creation and promotion of
international institutions. 20 2 The technical, rarified and inaccessible
nature of litigation may do little to contribute to the growth of
grassroots social movements in certain contexts and communities,
especially where individuals are not accustomed to invoking judicial
processes to bring about social change. 20 3 Likewise, lawyers may
actually displace natural leaders within community groups, leading to
the disempowerment, and even demise, of the group. 20 4 In addition,
litigation (and its attendant legalisms such as standing rules, statutes
of limitation, or justiciability doctrines) may diffuse political or moral
claims rather than empower potential political constituencies. Indeed,
litigation in the United States may ultimately contravene or
undermine the strategies of local activists where it is not part of a
campaign at the grassroots level in the targeted country.
For example, a number of lawsuits were filed recently on behalf
of African-American descendants of slaves and former slaves against
companies allegedly unjustly enriched by the practice of slavery
during the antebellum period by, for example, loaning money to slave
traders and owners, utilizing slave labor, and insuring slaves as
property for slaveholders. 2 5 Defendants jointly sought dismissal on
199. See Yamamoto, supra note 185, at 482 (discussing the history of U.S. efforts to provide
Japanese-Americans with reparations).
200. See Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global
Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 386-87
(1996) (discussing how transnational advocacy can supplement U.S. labor laws to help workers
respond to new pressures of the global economy).
201. For example, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has been considering a set of
nonbinding human rights standards for transnational corporations. Norms on the Responsibility
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
U.N. ESCOR Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item
4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/203/12/Rev. 2 (2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
links/norms-Aug2003.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
202. Id.; Rishikoff, supra note 17, at 274.
203. Quigley, supra note 12, at 465-75.
204. Id. at 462-63.
205. The individual lawsuits were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois. In re
African American Slave Descendants Litig., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing, the statute of limitations had
expired, the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question. 20 6 In dismissing the case without prejudice, the court "in an
abundance of caution" meticulously affirmed each of defendants'
arguments for dismissal.20 7 With respect to defendants' defense on
standing, for example, the court found plaintiffs had not established a
link between the defendants and the alleged harm and that plaintiffs
did not have a personal stake in the dispute or a particularized
injury. 20 At the same time, when ruling on defendants' political
question defense, the court determined that the issues raised by the
complaint were best resolved by the representative branches of
government. 20 9 It remains to be seen whether these rulings will
bolster the reparations movement's 210 political claims or provide
juridical fuel for opponents, but it is clear that the political grounds
have indelibly shifted in light of the court's ruling.
The high-profile nature of ATCA-style litigation creates the
potential to generate legislative, executive, and other "backlash"
211
that might nullify gains made in litigation. Indeed, it is apparent that
the more ambitious applications of ATCA-style litigation have perhaps
subjected the ATCA to new political vulnerabilities. In particular,
opposition to human rights litigation in United States has crystallized
along two dimensions, with the two primary foes to a certain degree
working in tandem. First, the corporate cases have mobilized a
powerful constituency of multinational corporations who have circled
the wagons in defense of their brethren. Various corporate consortia
have filed amicus briefs attesting to difficulties, or the increased costs,
of conducting business abroad where human rights litigation is a
risk21 2 and have initiated at least preliminary discussions about
206. In re African American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1044 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
207. Id. at 1053-65.
208. Id. at 1047-48.
209. Id. at 1060.
210. See generally National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'Cobra)
(discussing the reparations movement), available at http://www.ncobra.org/aboutus.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005); Reparations Coordinating Committee, Tulsa Reparations Litigation,
available at http:/Ihomepage.mac.commillerej1llMenu2.html (last visited Feb.7, 2005).
211. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1011.
212. Brief of the National Foreign Trade Council, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,, 124 S.Ct. 2739
(2004) (No. 03-339), available at http://www.nosafehaven.org/llegal/atca conNFTC
supportingSosa.pdf; Brief of National Association of Manufacturers, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339), available at http://www.nosafehaven.org-llegal
/atca con NAMsupportsSosa.pdf; Brief of the National Foreign Trade Council et al, Doe v.
Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716
2004] 2345
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:6:2305
potential legislative "reform" of the ATCA. 213  Second, the Bush
administration, in a change in executive policy toward human rights
litigation in United States courts, 214 has intervened in a number of
cases that in its estimation conflict with, or at a minimum complicate,
U.S. foreign policy concerns, as where officials or heads of state from
allied or powerful countries are sued.
215
Backlash may also occur in the countries that are the subject of
suit.21 6 In particular, U.S. judgments may be resisted by individuals
in power as a form of judicial imperialism or neocolonialism, especially
when default judgments are obtained. 217 This, in turn, may actually
enhance the stature of defendants and cloak them in the mantle of the
political martyr. Indeed, "[tihe possibility of resistance matters,
because the events that have given rise to the lawsuits in question
remain largely under the control of foreign governments and beyond
the reach of U.S. courts."218 For example, the apartheid litigation
21 9
has generated significant opposition within high political circles in
South Africa, 220 although the cases have generated some NGO and
(2003), available at http://www.nftc.org/defaultlusa%20engage/unocal%20amicus.pdf. The
corporate campaign against the ATCA has been spearheaded by USA Engage, a coalition of
business organizations opposed to unilateral sanctions regimes, see http://www.usaengage.org/
aboutus/index.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
213. Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm: Suits that Claim Overseas Abuse Are Putting U.S.
Executives on Alert and Their Lawyers On Call, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003.
214. Compare Brief for the United States, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004)
(No. 03-339) (opposing suits), available at
http://www.nosafehaven.org/jlegal/atca con-USsupportingSosa.pdf; Brief for the United States,
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628),
http://www.nftc.org/default/usa%20engagelbrief-as-filed.pdf (same), with Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Fil~rtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 585 (1980) (No. 79-6090) (supporting jurisdiction).
215. See generally Brian C. Free, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the
Cautious Use of Executive Opinions in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y
467 (2003) (discussing a case against Exxon Mobile Corporation and the power of federal courts
to remedy human rights violations committed abroad when a judicial resolution is opposed by
the executive branch).
216. Stephan, supra note 8, at 630, 651 (noting potential for lawsuits in U.S. courts to "invite
hostility and retaliation" rather than prompt reform).
217. Charles F. Hollis, III, Perpetual Mistrial: The Impropriety of Transnational Human
Rights Litigation in United States Courts, 1 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.scu.edu/scjil/current/FinalHollisArticlePage3.shtml.
218. Stephan, supra note 8, at 657.
219. In re South Africa Apartheid Litigation, MDL 1499, 02-MD-1499 (JES), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13797 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003).
220. See Thabo Mbeki, South African President, Statement to the National Houses of
Parliament and the Nation on the Occasion of the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission 9 (Apr. 15, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.nftc.org/default/
ussabc/MbekiSp.pdf) ("[W]e consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are central
to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts which bear no responsibility
for the well-being of our country and the observance of the perspective contained in our
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popular support. 221  Where suits proceed far from the events in
question, a foreign judgment may not carry the moral legitimacy




Human rights cases brought in United States courts evince a
faith in the power of "impact" litigation to achieve goals that
transcend the dispute between individual litigants. In practice, it is
clear that human rights litigation produces important first order
results, especially in the realm of corrective justice for victims, which
may be operative regardless of formal outcomes. These results are the
most tangible on the micro scale and become more diffuse and
speculative as the lens moves farther from the immediate parties.
Thus, human rights litigation has empowered individuals even where
it has not necessarily constrained perpetrators. The present limits on
what human rights litigation can achieve beyond the re-ordering of
relations between the two parties and toward the reform of state
practices should not overshadow what these cases can achieve,
because these results are worthy of praise and duplication. These
limits do, however, caution against adopting an unreasonable faith in
the power of litigation. That said, the increasing potential of such
litigation to contribute to a burgeoning movement toward
accountability for rights violations pursued by complementary state
and international institutions is tantalizing.
Thus, litigation must remain one component of a multifaceted
strategy toward the enforcement, broadly defined, of human rights
norms. Practitioners must be attuned to whether political, social and
economic forces have pushed a particular society to a point where
litigation in a foreign forum can make an impact. In addition,
Constitution of the promotion of national reconciliation."); see also Declaration from Penuell
Mpapa Maduna, South African Minister of Justice, to Judge John E. Sprizzo (July 11, 2001)
(expressing his views on the the apartheid litigation) at http://www.nftc.org/default/ussabc/
Maduna%20Declaration.pdf. But see generally Supplemental Declaration in Opposition to
Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, In re South Africa Apartheid
Litigation, MDL 1499, 02-MD-1499 (JES), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003),
available at http://www.woek.de/pdffkasa-tutuaffidavit-dec-2003.pdf (supporting litigation).
221. The plaintiff in one of the Apartheid litigation suits, the Khulumani Support Group, is
an NGO for victims of the apartheid regime, see http://www.khulumani.netlindex.php
?option=com-content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=60;http://www.khulumani.net/index.php?optio
n=comcontent&task=category&sectionid=4&id=7&Itemid=63.
222. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 486 (1999) (noting that judgments against defendants may not generate
the desired "signaling effect" if the process is considered biased or illegitimate).
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practitioners must remain sensitive to the way in which litigation in a
foreign forum is embedded within a broader human rights strategy of
a particular community. Thus, litigation may be able to mobilize
victims of human rights violations or support a campaign against a
particular company or practice at the grassroots level, especially
where activists on the ground are consulted on whether and how
human rights litigation in the United States might advance their
domestic strategies and goals. By contrast, these "cascade effects"
may be inoperative where litigation proceeds in a foreign vacuum. A
focus on litigation here to the exclusion of other processes of social
change has the potential to marginalize the voices of victims of human
rights abuses and derail other potentially efficacious strategies for
social change. To the extent that human rights cases are pursued by
attorneys from outside of the human rights movement, human rights
attorneys and activists must engage with counsel to ensure that
human rights values are brought to bear on the process.
Even where systemic change remains elusive, it must not be
forgotten that small victories are meaningful. 223 This brings us back
to the client advocacy model of public interest litigation. In striving
for greater impact, practitioners must not neglect the client. In many
respects, an enduring value of human rights litigation is the
transformative potential of litigation on individual participants.
Indeed, the highest ideals of the law can in many respects be achieved
through good client advocacy: the representation of persons in pain,
one individual at a time.
223. Matsuda, supra note 60, at 347.
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